O Robinson-Patman Act não está morto!

Para muitos, encontra-se em desuso ou, pior, teria efeitos negativos para a concorrência, se aplicado. No entanto, o Robinson-Patman Act (RPA) continua em vigor e as cortes norte-americanas continuam coibindo a discriminação de preços...

Tirando o pó...

O RPA, de 1936, declarou ilegal discriminar o preço de venda de produto de "like grade or quality" cobrado de diferentes clientes, "where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them".

É ilegal a discriminação de preços que pode prejudicar a competição (injury competition) em qualquer um dos três níveis: no próprio mercado de atuação de quem pratica a discriminação (primary-line injury) ou no mercado dos dois níveis subseqüentes, das empresas que diretamente compram o produto com preço diferenciado (secundary-line injury) ou de seus clientes (tertiary-line injury).

Caso novo

Em 2006, a Feesers, Inc. ingressou em primeira instância contra a Michael Foods, Inc. e a Sodexho, Inc.: discriminação de preços de produtos (ovo e batata) comercializados pela Michael Foods para a Feesers e a Sodexho. Esta atua na gestão de estabelecimentos que comercializam alimentos (hospitais, escolas etc.) e também vende os produtos em questão para esses estabelecimentos. A Feesers apenas vende os produtos, não atuando na gestão.

Os principais fatos não foram objeto de disputa: os preços praticados pela Michael Foods são diferentes e os produtos comercializados são idênticos. O que trouxe o caso à Corte de Apelação foi a decisão da Corte Distrital de garantir summary judgment em favor das rés, ao considerar que a Feesers falhou ao demonstrar que é efetiva concorrente da Sodexho. Há poucos dias a Corte de Apelação proferiu sentença, revertendo a decisão da Corte Distrital.

Segue síntese da decisão*:

Feesers was required to show that there is “a reasonable possibility that [the] price difference may harm
competition,” i.e., “competitive injury.” [...] “Competitive injury” is established prima facie by proof
of “a substantial price discrimination between competing purchasers over time.”
[...]
In order to establish a prima facie violation of section 2(a), Feesers does not need to prove that Michael Foods’ price discrimination actually harmed competition, i.e., that the discriminatory pricing caused Feesers to lose customers to Sodexho. Rather, Feesers need only prove that (a) it competed with Sodexho to sell food and (b) there was price discrimination over time by Michael Foods.
[...]
The District Court was concerned that Sodexho and Feesers are not at the same “functional level” and are therefore not in “actual competition” in the same market.
[...]
The evidence here could lead to a different conclusion than that reached by the District Court. Although Sodexho resells Michael Foods products to foodservice facilities that it operates, while Feesers resells Michael Foods products to self-operated foodservice facilities, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Feesers, shows that Feesers’ customers and Sodexho’s customers are not two separate and discrete groups of foodservice facilities.
[...]
The inference could be rebutted with evidence proffered by defendants that the price discrimination does not cause foodservice facilities to decide to buy food from Sodexho rather than Feesers. However, the
District Court improperly put the burden on Feesers to prove that a difference in the price of products causes facilities to switch from buying from Feesers to buying from Sodexho [...] This was error. The burden is on defendants to show the absence of the causal link.
[...]
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth, we will reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

* As ênfases constam do original. Posso mandá-la por e-mail.